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Resistance of communities against
disinformation
Amirarsalan Rajabi, Seyyedmilad Talebzadehhosseini, and Ivan Garibay
Abstract The spread of disinformation is considered a big threat to societies and
has recently received unprecedented attention. In this paper we propose an agent-
based model to simulate dissemination of a conspiracy in a population. The model
is able to compare the resistance of different network structures against the activity
of conspirators. Results show that connectedness of network structure and centrality
of conspirators are of crucial importance in preventing conspiracies from becoming
widespread.
1 Introduction
We define conspiratorial thinking as a belief held by an individual or a group of
individuals, while there is enough evidence and information to undermine or totally
refute the belief. If some conspiracy theories get popular support, it may cause se-
rious concerns.This is particularly true of conspiracies over scientific and medical
issues where conspiracy theories can result in rejection of the scientific method [20].
Several underlying reasons have been proposed to explain the existence of con-
spiracy theories. According to Barkun, conspiratorial thinking exhibits three charac-
teristics: Firstly, nothing happens by accident. Secondly, things are not as they seems
on surface. And thirdly, things are highly connected [6]. All three characteristics
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mentioned by Barkun, refer to a special cognitive function of the conspiracy theo-
rist. Indeed, a great deal of literature on conspiracy theory associates conspiratorial
thinking with a special and different heuristic of the conspiracy theorist. On the other
hand, Sunstein and Vermeule claim that many of those who hold conspiracy theories
do so not as a result of a mental illness of any kind, or of simple irrationality, but as a
result of crippled epistemology (knowing very few things, which are indeed wrong)
[23]. For most of what they believe and know, human beings lack direct informa-
tion; they must rely on what others say and think. Hardin argues many people suffer
from crippled epistemology, meaning they only get their information from a few in-
correct sources [10]. Crippled epistemology usually takes place in echo chambers.
Echo chambers are communities in which individuals merely communicate with
each other and rarely seek information from entities outside the community. The
advent of social media platforms has resulted in the rise of echo-chambers [3]. Echo
chambers play an important role in political and social polarization [5]. The nega-
tive effects of polarization in social networks is studied in [16]. Bauman states that
individuals who are embedded in isolated groups or small, self-enclosed networks
who are thus exposed only to skewed information, will more often hold conspiracy
theories that are justified, relative to their limited informational environment [7].
The study of the dynamics by which the echo chambers form, can therefore shed
light on the mechanisms by which conspiratorial thinking forms and thrives in a
community.
Traditional studies of conspiratorial thinking assume that conspiratorial thinking
extinguishes in large network structure [17], and that conspiratorial ideation is be-
cause of flawed reasoning and biased heuristics [6]. This study challenges both of
these claims. Contrary to a large body of literature on conspiracy theory that stud-
ies the cognitive function of isolated individuals [22], this paper takes into account
systemic belief dissemination as a result of interactions between individuals.
2 Opinion Dynamics
Opinion formation is a complex process which is formed by the interaction of mul-
tiple underlying elements. People tend to form their opinion on a wide variety of
subjects through the process of learning. Social learning is a term referring to the
process of learning through the communication of individuals with each other, their
own experience and their observations of others experiences, media sources, propa-
ganda and indoctrination from political leaders and the state [1]. In this paper, we
refer to models of opinion dynamics as mathematical models that aim at capturing
the dynamics of social learning, opinion spreading, collective decision making, and
so on from a mathematical point of view.
Models of opinion dynamics can be divided into two categories : Bayesian mod-
els of opinion dynamics and non-Bayesian models of opinion dynamics. Bayesian
models rely on Bayes rule [9]. These kinds of models assume that an individual
(agent) is Bayesian rational and update their belief optimally with respect to Bayes
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rule, given an underlying model of the world. One problem with Bayesian models of
opinion dynamics is that these models make a lot of assumptions. One demanding
assumption of these models is that an agent must have a reliable prior assumption
about the world, an assumption that might be unrealistic in many cases. Addition-
ally, it is assumed that they then go on and update their prior beliefs based on the new
information that they get from others. Bayesian models also put too much structure
on updating by ruling out zero probability events [1]. The aforementioned problems
make Bayesian models unfavorable to be incorporated in our study of dissemination
of conspiracy theories.
Non-Bayesian approaches and models on the other hand try to avoid some of
these problems. Non-Bayesian approaches are believed to be more effective in mod-
eling belief manipulation and the spread of disinformation. The simplest of these
models start by specifying rules of thumb [1]. Several different non-Bayesian mod-
els exist. Classical models of interacting particle systems which in inspired by sta-
tistical mechanics inspires many of these models (see for example see for example
[12]; [15]; [19]; [11]; [18]).
One noteworthy non-Bayesian model is DeGroot (1974) [13]. In this model, a
set of interacting agents start by an initial beliefs about an underlying state held by
each agent, and exchange information about their beliefs with their neighbors and
update their beliefs at discrete time instances, with respect to a weight matrix that
represents the social network structure of interactions. This model captures the imi-
tation aspect of non-Bayesian models. While notably innovative, this model suffers
from duplication of information [2], meaning that agents in this model might inter-
act endlessly with their neighbors that hold unchanging opinions in each timestep.
3 Model of Conspirators
Our agent-based model is inspired by the variation of Acemoglu et. al. on DeGroot
model [2]. In our model, two types of agents exist. Majority of agents are suscepti-
ble agents and a minority of agents exist that are called conspirators. Conspirators
deliberately disseminate false information to susceptibles.
Let’s consider a conceptual underlying state of the world and call it Θ . We as-
sume that the true value of Θ is 1, and the discussion between agents in the model
is on the true value ofΘ . xsi (k) and xci (k) represent the opinion of susceptible agent i
at time k, and the opinion of conspirator agent i at time k, respectively. At first, each
susceptible agent holds an initial belief about the underlying state. N shows the to-
tal number of agents in the model. The initial belief of each susceptible agent is a
randomly generated float number between zero and two, the initial belief of each
conspirator agent is 0, and the average of initial beliefs of all susceptible agents is
very close to one:
xsi (0) ∈ [0,2] xci (0) = 0
1
N∑i
xsi (0)≈ 1 (1)
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Hence although at first each susceptible agent has their own initial belief on the
underlying state Θ , there is a consensus on this underlying state between the sus-
ceptible agents. On the other hand, the initial belief of conspirator agents is 0 and
remains 0 during the simulation, irrespective of their interactions. These could be
thought of as individuals, entities, media or propaganda outlets that deliberately and
constantly disseminate false information throughout the population.
There are two main differences of between our proposed model and the work
of [2]: 1) Agents are not able to freely communicate directly with any other agents.
Rather, each agent is only able to communicate with the agents that she is connected
to by a link. This means that a network structure regulates the communication in
the population. 2) In the variation of [2] on DeGroot model, each agent meets and
communicates with other agents at instances defined by a rate one Poisson process
independent of other agents. In our model agents are connected to each other by
undirected links, and together, they form a network. in each timestep of the simula-
tion, an agent will choose another agent to which it is connected and may or may not
communicate with them. In this model, the capacity of an agent for communication
in each timestep is the number of her links. For example an agent with 5 links will
communicate with 5 or less other agents in each timestep.
Following the interaction of two agents i and j, there is a potential exchange of
information between them with probability pinteraction. Agents update their beliefs
according to one of the following possibilities:
(a) Scale Free (Barabasi-Albert) (b) Small World (Watts-Strogatz)
Fig. 1: NetLogo environment. A) shows a network generated with Barabasi-Albert
algorithm. B) shows a network generated by Watts-Strogat algorithm
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If i and j are both susceptibles:{
xi(k+1) = x j(k+1) = 12 [xi(k)+ x j(k)] with probability p
xi(k+1) = xi(k) & x j(k+1) = x j(k) with probability 1−p
If i is susceptible and j is conspirator:
xi(k+1) =
xi(k)+0
2 with probability p
xi(k+1) = xi(k) with probability 1−p
x j(k+1) = x j(k) = 0 with probability 1
If i and j are both conspirators: no opinion sharing.
The underlying network structure of the model plays an important role in deter-
mining the behavior of the model, and it is itself determined by the algorithm by
which the model forms the network. It determines which agents are connected to
each other, how easily the information would propagate throughout the network,
and so forth.
Watts and Strogatz proposed a model to capture the small world, high cluster-
ing, and low average path properties of real complex networks [25]. On the other
hand, Barabasi and Albert showed that power-law degree distribution is the prop-
erty of many real world networks and proposed an algorithm that can capture this
phenomenon [4]. Indeed, it is believed that majority of complex networks exhibit
small world and scale free properties [24]. In order to capture all of these essential
properties, the model generates the network of agents using both Watts-Strogatz and
Barabasi-Albert algorithms.
4 Results
We developed our agent-based model in NetLogo [23]. Figure 1 shows two instances
of the model with watts-strogatz and Barabasi-Albert model. For our purposes we
defined a variable named collective-thought. This variable is simply the average of
the belief of all susceptible agents and represents the collective belief of the popu-
lation about the underlying state Θ . Collective-thought starts with a value close to
one, and always converges to zero(Figure 2).
A desired population is one that resists the activity of conspirators. Numerous
individuals and groups deliberately disseminate false information in a society. As
we know the collective-thought of the model always converges to zero after some
timesteps. We call this state the convergence. In order to quantify the resistance of
a network against the activity of conspirators, we record the number of timesteps
required for collective-thought of the network to converge. This number can be
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(a) Scale Free (Barabasi-Albert) (b) Small World (Watts-Strogatz)
Fig. 2: Figure show the required timesteps required for the network’s collective-
thought to converge. Small world network tends to be deceived more quickly than a
scale free network.
thought of as symbolically representing how long a society resist the effort of con-
spirators, before it is nearly deceived into believing that the underlying state Θ is
zero.
We argue that contrary to conventional belief that conspiratorial beliefs are unten-
able with larger network structure (e.g. [17]), a large network cannot ensure eradica-
tion of conspiratorial beliefs. Indeed, the important aspect of a network structure that
can ensure resistance against conspiracies is the connectedness of the network;that
is, how easily an agent can send an information through the network to any other
agent. A network with high connectedness means that information propagates more
easily and eco-chambers are less likely to form. We needed to come up with a bench-
mark that enables us to quantitatively compare different networks by our objective
of connectedness. For this purpose, the model records the mean path length of the
network in each instance of the simulation as follows [14]:
mean path length = average shortest path between all distincrt pairs of nodes in network
(2)
The model was run 1000 times for each of the Watts-Strogatz and Barabasi-
Albert networks. In each run, the required timsteps for the collective-thought to
converge and the mean path length of the network were recorded. Figure 3 shows
that there is a positive relationship between mean path length of the network, and
required timesteps for the collective-thought to reach convergence. With Barabasi-
Albert algorithm, the Pearson correlation coefficient between the mean path length
and the required timesteps was 0.18, with a p-value less than 0.00001 which shows
the correlation is statistically significant. The corresponding coefficient for Watts-
Strogatz networks was 0.39 with a p-value less than 0.00001, which shows this
correlation is also significant. These results prove our hypothesis that the connect-
edness of a network improves its resistance against conspirators.
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(a) Scale Free (Barabasi-Albert) (b) Small World (Watts-Strogatz)
Fig. 3: The relationship between mean path length and the required timesteps for
a population’s collective-thought to converge in A)scale free and B)small world
networks
Besides the connectedness of a network, the structural position of conspirators in
a network determines the reach of their disinformation and enhances their ability to
disseminate their message through the whole population more effectively. To show
that our model captures this phenomenon, we assigned to each agent in the network
their eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of centrality in a
network [21]. The more central a node is, the closer it is to all other nodes.
The model was run 1000 times for each of the Watts-Strogatz and Barabasi-
Albert networks. For each run, the required timsteps for the collective belief to reach
convergence and the sum of the eigenvector centrality of conspirator agents were
recorded. Figure 4 shows the negative relationship between required timesteps for
collective-thought to reach convergence and the sum of the eigenvector centrality
of conspirators. With Barabasi-Albert algorithm, the Pearson correlation coefficient
between the mean path length and the required timesteps was -0.19, with a p-value
(a) Scale Free (Barabasi-Albert) (b) Small World (Watts-Strogatz)
Fig. 4: The relationship between sum of the eigenvector of all 4 conspirators and the
required timesteps for a population’s collective-thought to converge in A)scale free
and B)small world networks
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less than 0.00001 which shows the correlation is statistically significant. The corre-
sponding coefficient for Watts-Strogatz networks was -0.42 with a p-value less than
0.00001, which shows this correlation is also statistically significant.
5 Discussion
The model shows promising results in that its vulnerability is correlated with the
connectedness of the network and the importance (eigenvector) of conspirators.
Considering the minimum required time, the resistance of a population against con-
spiracies was imitated. The results show that a network that is built by the Watts-
Strogatz algorithm was slightly more vulnerable to conspiracies than a network
which is built by Barabasi-Albert algorithm (scale free). The reason for this dif-
ference might be that a Watts-Strogatz network has a high local clustering, while
holding a short average path length like random networks, therefore the propagation
of (dis)information is easier and faster in them. On the other hand, while noting that
we used only 4 conspirators in our model, and the total number of agents were 100,
the probability that conspirators become a hub was low, and therefore their ability
to propagate their conspiracy was slightly smaller than in Watts-Strogatz network.
A probable misinterpretation here might be that a less connected network is better
against conspiracy theories. This is not correct because in our model, only con-
spirators were acting to deceive the population and were trying to propagate their
disinformation in the whole network. In fact, the results of this study can be in-
terpreted in a content-agnostic manner. In reality, both sides of the discussion try
to influence the network. Nevertheless, both networks show that the connectedness
and the eigenvector centrality of conspirators is a network is highly correlated with
the network’s vulnerability to conspiracies.
This was a first step to make a framework for computational study of conspiracy
propagation. Further research must be conducted using other network formation
algorithms. Other ranges of conspirators’ ratio and population sizes should also be
experimented. Another extension to this research might be to test the effect of multi-
dimensional opinion-space in agents. Finally, other non-Bayesian models of opinion
dynamics could be tested.
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